The interdependence between the optimal degree of wage indexation and optimal monetary policy is analyzed for a small open economy under a variety of assumptions regarding: (i) relative information available to private agents and the stabilization authority; (ii) the perceived nature of the disturbances impinging on the economy. The distinctions between: (a) unanticipated and anticipated disturbances, and (b) permanent and transitory disturbances, are emphasized. The extent to which stabilization is achieved is shown to depend upon the nature of the disturbances and the available information. The policy redundancy issue is emphasized, implying that optimal rules can frequently be specified in many equivalent ways.
INTRODUCTION
Recent research in international macroeconomics has emphasized the interdependence between the degree of wage indexation and the choice of exchange rate regime from the viewpoint of optimal stabilization policy. Authors such as Marston (1982) , Flood and Marion (1982) , among others, have shown how: (i) the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rate systems depends upon the degree of wage indexation; (ii) the choice of the optimal degree of wage indexation depends upon the exchange rate regime.1
More recently, Turnovsky (1983) and Aizenman and Frenkel (1985) have begun to take a more integrated approach to the question of the optimal stabilization of an open economy, by analyzing general rules for wage indexation and monetary policy. These authors focus on the tradeoffs between these as stabilization instruments, and their approach is directed at the design of overall, integrated, stabilization policy 'packages.' Taking monetary policy to be in the form of exchange market intervention, Turnovsky showed how the degree of intervention impinges on the effectiveness of wage indexation, and vice versa. Full indexation of wages to prices renders exchange market intervention ineffective in stabilizing output. At the same time, intervention resulting in an accommodation of the domestic money supply precisely equal to the change in the demand for money due to movements in the exchange rate, makes wage indexation become totally ineffective.2 Aizenman and Frenkel consider the joint determination of optimal indexation and optimal monetary policy among more general forms of monetary policy rules. Their analysis stresses the relationship between the number of independent pieces of information regarding the sources of stochastic disturbances impinging on the economy and the number of independent policy parameters.
The optimal policy literature deals almost exclusively with stabilizing white noise disturbances; i.e., the stochastic shocks impinging on the economy are unanticipated, transitory and are independently distributed over time.3 In practice, the distinction between permanent and transitory disturbances, on the one hand, and anticipated and unanticipated disturbances, on the other, is an extremely important one. Different types of disturbances are reflected differently in the economy and require different policy responses. Some of these have been considered for monetary rules by Turnovsky (1984) . This paper addresses the interdependence between optimal monetary policy and optimal wage indexation in an economy in which the exogenous disturbances may be of a quite general type. The situation we envisage is an economy in which one-period wage contracts are signed in each period. These contracts introduce rigidities into the economy and the purpose of the monetary and wage indexation rules is to attempt to eliminate these rigidities and to replicate the behavior of a frictionless economy.
We assume that there are two types of random disturbances impinging on the economy.
An important element in our analysis concerns the availability of information on these variables. First, there are price and financial variables, information on which is available to all agents instantaneously. Secondly, there are real and monetary shocks, which may or may not be observed contemporaneously. Indeed, we shall show how both the form of the optimal rules and, in some cases the ability to replicate the frictionless economy, depends critically upon the availability of information to agents in the economy.
THE FRAMEWORK
This section outlines the analytical framework. To minimize details, a simple model will be employed. We consider a small open economy which produces and consumes a single traded good. We also assume a single traded bond, with the domestic bond market being perfectly integrated with that in the rest of the world. Thus purchasing power parity (PPP) and uncovered interest parity (UIP) are assumed to hold.
A. Availability of Information
A key feature of our analysis concerns the availability of information. Our characterization of this is illustrated in Fig. 1 , considered from the viewpoint of time t, which we partition into the infinitesimally short sub-period (t, t+).
At time t-l, a contract is signed for the wage at time t, this being determined on the basis of expectations formed at time t-l. Prices and financial variables are assumed to be observed instantaneously by all agents, so that everyone has complete current information on these variables when they make their respective decisions. More specifically, these instantaneously observed variables include:
(i) the domestic and foreign interest rates;
(ii) the exchange rate;
(iii) the domestic price leveL Given PPP, (ii) and (iii) imply the observability of the foreign price level as well.
At time t, two sets of decisions are made. First, there are policy decisions; i.e., the implementation of the wage indexation and monetary policy rules. Here we assume, largely for expositional simplicity, that wage indexation is conducted by a public authority, as indeed is the case in countries such as Israel and Australia. This has the advantage of enabling us to identify all stabilization activities as being conducted by a public authority. Secondly, there are the decisions of the private agents in the economy, which include the production, portfolio, and consumption decisions, as well as the formation of forecasts for the next period. We assume that these two sets of decisions are made in the above order, at instances we denote by t, t+, respectively. This means that the actual indexed wage, which is determined at time t, is known by the time the production decision is made at the next instant of time, t+. This distinction in effect differentiates the information available to the public and private agents in the economy. It is possible to make further distinctions among the various private agents along the lines of Canzonerj, Henderson, and Rogoff (1983) . For example, one can allow investors, who form predictions of the future exchange rate, to have different information from individuals concerned with predicting prices in the determination of the wage contract. And their information may differ from that of producers. We do not pursue these refinements here.
The key informational issue concerns the observability of the domestic monetary disturbance, ut say, and the domestic productivity disturbance, Vg say. Under our assumptions, three different informational situations exist (1) ut, v are observed instantaneously at time t by both public and private agents.
As we shall show, this full information assumption is in effect the information structure considered by Karni (1983) and indeed, we shall obtain a modified form of his indexation rule as one optimal policy.4 (ii) u, Vt are observed in the time interval (t, t+). They are therefore unobserved by the stabilization authority, but known to private agents.
This asymmetric information assumption is made throughout much of the literature; see e.g. Gray (1976) , Canzoneri (1982) , Turnovsky (1983) , and several of the papers in Bhandari (1985) .
(iii) Ut, Vg are observed after time t+. They are therefore unknown to both public and private agents at the time decisions for time t are made.
In this case, agents form estimates of Ut, v at time t, as required for production or forecasting decisions, by utilizing information on the observed financial variables. This information structure is again symmetric between public and private agents and is the one adopted by Aizenman and Frenkel (1985) .
B. The Demand Side
The demand side of the economy is summarized by the following three equations: 
C. The Supply Side
The supply function is based on the one-period wage contract model. We assume that the contract wage for time t is determined at time t-I such that, given expectations of firms and workers, the labor market is expected to clear. The information set upon which the contract is based includes all financial and price variables up till and including time t-l; i.e., all past stochastic disturbances. It may, or may not, include the actual disturbances occurring at that time. In terms of our timing scheme, the contract for time t is signed at time (t -1 )+.
The expected supply of labor at the contract wage is The expected demand for labor, N_1, (based on expected profit maximization), is determined by the marginal productivity condition
The contract wage is determined by equating the expected demand and supply of labor in (1) and (5) Actual employment is assumed to be determined by the short-run marginal productivity condition, after the actual wage and price are known. This is expressed by 1n(1-9)-9N ÷E(v)=W-P (8) Note that we have introduced the instantaneous forecast of the productivity disturbance, denoted by E(v), into the optimality condition (8). This allows for the possibility that firms do not observe this disturbance instantaneously.5 If it is observed, then E(v) = v; otherwise they must infer it from available information on current observable variables, using a forecasting technique we discuss below. Combining (5) and (8), current output is given by,
which depends upon both the firm's estimate of v and v itself. In the event that v iS observed, (9) simplifies to
In the situation that the productivity disturbance is observed instantaneously, the optimal form of the wage indexation rule will become immediately apparent and will be discussed later. Otherwise, we assume that wages are indexed in accordance with the simple rule W =W +r(P -P1)
where r is the indexation parameter to be determined. Combining (10) and (7) with (9) or (9'), yields the following alternative forms of supply functions, which correspond to the observability or otherwise of the productivity disturbance,
E. Monetary Policy Rule
In the case that the monetary authorities observe all disturbances instantaneously, the optimal rule becomes self-evident. Otherwise, we assume that the monetary authorities adjust the money supply in accordance with observed movements in the financial and price variables
Using the PPP condition (1) and the UIP condition (3), this equation can be expressed as M = + ,h2Eti,t + tL3f2t + 4Q
Note that the money supply is assumed to be adjusted to a wider range of pieces of information than are wages. This reflects the prevailing practice of wage indexation being restricted to price movements. If, in addition, wages are assumed to be indexed to the foreign price level, nothing additional is gained as long as the money supply is adjusted to the foreign price level as well. There is a tradeoff between and the corresponding coefficient in the wage indexation rule.
We wiii argue below that wage indexation is inessential. The optimum we achieve can always be obtained by monetary policy alone. In some cases, it can also be achieved by a comprehensively based wage indexation scheme. But this is not always so. In one important case, monetary policy is always required to achieve the optimal degree of stability.
F. The Frictionless Economy
Wage contracts introduce rigidities into the economy, leading to welfare losses relative to a frictionless economy in which wages are fully flexible. The purpose of stabilization policy is to attempt to 'undo' these, thereby replicating as closely as possible the output of a frictionless economy, and minimizing these resulting welfare losses. It is well known that the supply of output in such an economy is given by
In the case that firms observe v instantaneously, (13) reduces to
The output level of the frictionless economy thus serves as a benchmark, with the stabilization objective being to minimize the variance of Y about Y(.6 9 G. The Complete Model
The above components can now be combined to yield the following summary of the economy. It is expressed in deviation form, about an initial equilibrium, these deviations being denoted by lower case letters. Thus we obtain
All expectations are assumed to be rational
where E is the expectations operator, conditional on information available at time t. Note that in the case that v is observed instantaneously to private agents, E(v) = v, and (14d) and
(1 4e) are amended appropriately. Also, in writing the supply function as in (1 4d), the one period conditional expectation of (14a) has been taken and substituted. Finally, we should emphasize that our notation (t, t+) introduced above is to parameterize the information sets available to the agents in the economy. All variables in the infinitesimal time interval (t, H.) are determined simultaneously.
GENERAL SOLUTION
The reduced form system (14) is a standard rational expectations macro model. The solution procedures are familiar, enabling our description to be brief.
First, we consider the observability of the stochastic disturbances implied by the observability of the financial variables and prices. With mt being adjusted in accordance with a known rule in response to observed variables, mt -Pt 15 observed at time t. Substituting for The conditional expectations for time t+j, formed at time t, are • a1(l +n) * = Ut÷j,t + 1 + nO Vj,g + (1 -/h4)qt-1-j,t -(a2 ÷ p3)wt.,t j = 0,1,2,...
The instantaneous forecast, z depends upon the observability of u, v. In general, we have
with z =;, when Vt iS observed.
Substituting (14a), (14c), (14d) into (14b) and taking conditional expectations, yields the following difference equation in exchange rate expectations:
Thus with this notation, we can show that the deviation of output from its frictionless level, Ytyf, is given by (20), the deviation in output can be written equivalently as:
This equation indicates that the deviation in output from the frictionless level depends upon revisions to forecasts made between time t-1 and time t in response to new information. In the case of observed variables, such as q, this is the unanticipated change in that variable. In the case of exchange rate expectations, it is the update in the forecast for time t÷1, between time t-1 and time t.
Our analysis below includes two important cases. The first is where all disturbances are unanticipated and transitory, so that = 0 for all t
The second is where the expectations of the composite variable z formed at time t are uniform throughout all future periods. Formally, this is described by z.j,t = say, i = 1,2, ,for all t (23) In particular, we consider the important case where the current disturbance in z is expected to be permanent so that z = E (z). In this case, the stable solution for exchange rate expectations both simplify to * __________ = z = 1,2, ..., for all t (24) --
FULL INFORMATION
Stabilization when both private agents and the stabilization authority have complete information on all random disturbances, including u, Vt, is straightforward, either by means of wage indexation or monetary policy.
Subtracting (13') from (9'), using (7), and writing the resulting expression in deviation form about the initial equilibrium, yields 25) so that Yt = yf, the frictionless level, provided wages are indexed in accordance with w =
That is, wages should be fully indexed to the unanticipated change in price and partially 
with the rule now being expressed in terms of unanticipated movements in output. This rule is essentially equivalent to the Karni (1983) stabilization rule, which dealt with unanticipated disturbances.
Alternatively, subtracting (13') from the money market equilibrium condition, we obtain 1 1+n
Yt
so that for perfect stabilization, Yt = y(, we require l+n mt = Pt -cx2r + u + a1( + ii9 )v (28) Equations (26) and (28) provide alternative methods for replicating the output of the frictionless economy. Each of these offers advantages. The wage indexation scheme involves monitoring fewer pieces of information, although it does involve formulating forecasts of the productivity disturbance. On the other hand, the monetary rule requires more information, but observations on only current disturbances. Moreover, the authority need not attempt to determine whether a disturbance is permanent or transitory. Its nature will be reflected by movements in the (observed) interest rate. Finally, eliminating Pt between (26) and (28) yields a tradeoff between the adjustment in money supply and the wage rate.
UNANTICIPATED DISTURBANCES
We now return to equation (20) and determine the optimal monetary policy and wage indexation schemes in situations where there is incomplete information. The optimal policy rules are summarized in These optimal policies are determined as follows. Depending upon the disturbance, etj,t, e_1 are calculated from (21) and substituted into (20). The policy parameters, ii,, and r, are chosen to minimize var (yyf).
A. White Noise Disturbances
For white noise disturbances all expectations are zero, so from (22) e..jt = ett...j = 0
Thus, substituting into (20')
Note that the solution is independent of the monetary policy parameter This is because for white noise disturbances, e41 = 0. It is evident from (29) that the values of the optimal policy parameters which minimize var (yyf) can be obtained recursively. First, the effects of the foreign variables q, w can be neutralized by setting their respective coefficients in (29) to zero; then the remaining variance due to the domestic variables u, v, can be minimized.
Full wage indexation is non-optimal, since when r = 1, (29) reduces to 1-9
Vt 9 i+no rendering monetary policy ineffective for further variance reduction. Instead, the effects of the foreign variables can be eliminated by setting the optimal monetary policy parameters (denoted by n) /23 = -a2 (30a)
With the foreign variables eliminated, (29) simplifies to
The remaining choice is that of r, j, and this depends critically upon whether or not vt is observed.
If v is observed, then E (vi) = v, and it is easy to show that only one of the remaining policy parameters , , can be chosen independently. The optimal choice is constrained by the relationship ->0 A dr so that if wages are more fully indexed to prices, then the money supply should be expanded more (or contracted less) to a depreciation in the exchange rate.
Substituting (30a), (30b) into (14c) and using the PPP and UIP relationships, the optimal policies can be specified very simply by
where , , are linked by (31). Written in this way, both optimal policy rules have the convenience of enabling the domestic policy makers to monitor only domestic variables. In particular, one component of the optimal monetary rule requires accommodation to movements in the demand for money arising from changes in the interest rate. If = 0, the optimum can be reached through monetary policy alone, with being set in accordance with (31)?
Turning now to the case where u and v are not observed by private agents, we have from (16b) E(v) = (U + cv)
in which case (29') becomes Yt 1 1(1 9) -r) + (29") (1 +a2-p1)-(l -r)a1(1 -9)n + (u + czjv)
The optimal policy parameters, j, , obtained by setting the coefficient of the composite disturbance (u + ajv) to zero in (29) now satisfy
(1 +a2-1) =(1 -) 1 + a1(1 -8)ni (34) l+n9 1+n9 which again implies a positive tradeoff between them. In this case, the slope is steeper than before, implying that for a given degree of indexation, a greater monetary expansion (smaller monetary contraction) is required in response to a given depreciation in the exchange rate.
Substituting (30a), (30b) into (14c) and using the PPP and UIP conditions, the optimal policy rules are again given by (32a), (32b), except the tradeoff between ) and i is now given by (34) .
There is, however, a critical difference between these two cases. When private agents observe Ut and v, the optimal stabilization rule, based on incomplete information, is unable to replicate the output of the frictionless economy. In effect, the inferior information available to the stabilization authority prevents it from being able to track the behavior of a private frictionless economy perfectly. There is therefore some residual, positive var (Yt -yl). By contrast, when these disturbances are not observed by private agents, the optimal rules, with j, ?, satisfying (34) imply Yt = y(. With equal (imperfect) information to that of the private sector, the stabilization authority is able to replicate exactly the behavior of a frictionless economy.
The latter is precisely the result obtained by Aizenman and Frenkel (1985) .
B. Perceived Permanent Disturbances
Suppose now that the disturbances occurring at each point of time t have been previ- 
1 -
where E(z) is given by (18').
Substituting these expressions for expectations into (20'), the solution for y -v1 is given by
From (36) we can obtain the expressions for the optimal policies reported in the second column of Table 1 .
In the case where private agents, but not the stabilization authority, observe Ut, and v, we see by inspection that Yt is stabilized perfectly at the frictionless level, yf, for all t, by setting p = (1 + a2). The optimal policy rules are therefore = (1 + a2)e + p2etjt +
where /22 /23, /24, 1, are all arbitrary, the only restriction being rl. This is a generalization of the result obtained by Turnovsky (1984) in the absence of wage indexation. (41) thereby verifying that income is stabilized at its frictionless level.
=YI
It is interesting to note that in contrast to the white noise disturbances discussed above, the stabilization authority having incomplete information, can nevertheless replicate the equilibrium of a frictionless economy in response to this type of disturbance. It can dispense with wage indexation, and in fact, in the light of the PPP and UIP conditions, the optimal monetary rule can be expressed in a number of equivalent ways, e.g., m = (1 + c2)e; m = (1 + a2)p; m = (1 ÷ a2)r
The most convenient form will presumably depend upon the availability and reliability of the necessary information.
The situation where private agents do not observe Ut, v, leads to two sets of optimal policy rules, both of which yield perfect stabilization at the frictionless Output level, for all t.
Since (36) does not depend upon the observability of Ut, v, one optimal policy is obviously = (1 + a2), again giving rise to (37a), (37b).
The term in parentheses in (36) can be written in terms of the differences and (u + cXlVt) The second set of policy rules is obtained by setting the coefficients of these random variables to zero, thereby setting the right-hand side of (36) to zero. The resulting optimum is similar, but not identical to, that obtained previously. Specifically, J = -a2, /34 = + with ,, ?, being arbitrary, but subject to the constraint
l+nO If further, we choose = -a2, then this second set of policy rules reduces to (32a), (32b), with the tradeoff between j, , again being given by (34). This is identical to the optimal policy under white noise disturbances.
C. Uncertain Perceptions
Thus far, we have assumed that private agents are clear in their perceptions of whether the observed disturbances are permanent shifts or only transitory shocks. Of course in time they may turn out to be wrong, but our assumption is that agents can form a subjective characterization of them. Suppose instead, that agents are unable to decide whether a disturbance which has occurred represents a permanent shift or only a transitory shock. Assume that they formalize their uncertainty by assigning probabilities 9, 1 -9 say, respectively, to these two outcomes.'° In the case where private agents observe u, v, the expected exchange rate is
and the analysis can be carried out by substituting this expression into (20) . In this case it can be shown that if 9 < 1, perfect stabilization about the frictionless level of output is not possible.
On the other hand, if private agents do not observe u, v, we have seen that the rules (32a), (32b), together with (34) replicate the frictionless economy perfectly for both white noise or permanent shifts. This rule will therefore yield perfect stability irrespective of the private agents' perceptions of the nature of the shocks (i.e., for all values of 9).
ANTICIPATED DISTURBANCES
As another example, suppose that at time t-l agents perfectly anticipate all disturbances for time t (but not necessarily beyond). In the case of the instantaneously observed variables, this means, for example q_1 = q; while for the potentially unobserved variables = E(v That is, no new information on vt is forthcoming between time t-l and t, so that the one-period prediction equals the future (noisy) observation. It then follows that z_1 = E(z) so that (20') reduces to Yt -yl = (I ) (1r) (p. + a2) (e+j,t -(20") In this case, perfect stabilization about the frictionless economy can be easily accomplished in either of two ways: The deviation in output about the frictionless level therefore depends upon the unanticipated change in the current exchange rate. In general, (e -e_1) depends upon: (i) the unantici-pated components of the exogenous disturbances and (ii) any revisions to exchange rate expectations formed at time t. The assumption that the disturbances are correctly anticipated eliminates the former effect, while by adopting an intervention rule with P2 = -, the monetary authority eliminates the effects of the latter, which would otherwise impact through the money market. Hence setting /2 = 2' ensures that exchange rate expectations will be correct, which in turn implies perfect stabilization of output about its frictionless level.
Further, setting the arbitrary parameters p = /43 = 2' /14 = 0, the money supply rule can be written in the particularly simple form m = -a2r in which the domestic monetary authorities accommodate movement in the demand for money resulting from movements in the domestic interest rate.
An important aspect of these results is that in both cases the rule yields perfect stabilization irrespective of change in exchange rate expectations between time t-1 and time t. Since such changes, if they occur, reflect private agents' perceptions of disturbances occurring at that time, perfect stabilization of output is obtained irrespective of whether the shocks occurring at time t are perceived at that time as being permanent or transitory.
WAGE INDEXATION
It is seen from the analysis of Sections 4-6 that for the adopted policy specifications, wage indexaijon is inessentjal. All of the optima can be reached by the adoption of monetary policy alone. This is hardly surprising, given the asymmetry of information embodied in the monetary policy and wage indexation rules. At the same time we have shown that wage indexation alone can yield perfect stabilization in the cases of full information and perfectly anticipated disturbances. We now consider whether in the case of unanticipated disturbances, wage indexation rules, based on the same information as the above monetary rules, can achieve the same equilibria. Specifically, we consider the wage indexation rule
That is, wages are indexed to unanticipated changes in the foreign price level, the foreign interest rate, the expected exchange rate, in addition to the domestic price level. Given PPP, this rule is clearly an indexation analogue to the money supply rule (1 4c).
Repeating the previous analysis, we can show that with white noise disturbances, the choice of intervention parameters r1, r2, r3, r4, enables the replication of the equilibria of the previous equilibria to be obtained. The reason is that r2, r3, can eliminate the foreign variables q, wt; r4 is irrelevant and r1 can be chosen by setting = 0 in (31) or (34). In the case where private agents observe Ut, vt, only partial stabilization is obtained, while when neither private agents nor the stabilization authority observe these disturbances, perfect stabilization results.
In the case of initially unanticipated, but perceived permanent disturbances, we cannot get perfect stabilization about the frictionless economy with this more general wage indexation scheme alone, as long as private agents observe Ut, Vt. While indexation can stabilize for u, w the elimination of the supply shocks requires monetary policy. However, the generalized wage indexation scheme can achieve perfect stabilization when Ut and v are not observed by private agents.
The reason why wage indexation may, or may not, yield perfect stabilization can be seen from the supply function. For this purpose, we can set expectations at time I -1 to zero. In this case, the deviation in output about the frictionless level is
which is the case that v is observed is modified to Most of our attention has dealt with incomplete information. Where disturbances are unanticipated, we have drawn the distinction between those that are perceived as being transitory (white noise) and those that are perceived as being permanent shifts. In the case of the former, we find that the distortions due to the wage contract can be fully eliminated, thereby replicating the output of the frictionless economy, as long as private agents and the stablization authority have the same (imperfect) information. On the other hand, for perceived permanent shifts, perfect stabilization is achieved whether or not private agents and the stabilization authority have identical information. In the case where the information sets are identical, there are two sets of policy rules which achieved perfect stabilization. We have also considered the situation in which private agents are unable to decide whether or not a disturbance which has occurred is permanent or transitory and show that with identical information between private and public agents, perfect stabilization can be achieved. This is not so, however, where private agents have an informational advantage.
Finally, we have determined the optimal policies when disturbances are anticipated. We have shown how perfect stabilization may be achieved either by fully indexing wages to prices or by a simple rule accommodating the money supply to changes in the demand for money arising from movements in the domestic interest rate. In both cases, the perfect stabilization obtains irrespective of whether the disturbances are expected to be temporary or permanent.
Our analysis emphasizes the policy redundancy issue. That is, some of the policy coefficients can be set arbitrarily, enabling the policy rules to be specified in many equivalent ways.
In all cases wage indexation is inessential, in the sense that the equilibrium can be achieved through monetary policy alone. While this is largely a consequence of relatively rich specification of the monetary policy rule, this is not entirely so. In one important case, where private agents have perfect information and perceive all shocks as being permanent, perfect stabilization, which can be achieved through a very simple monetary policy rule, cannot be accomplished through wage indexation based on equivalent information.
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1.
See e.g., Aizenman (1985) , Marston (1984) . There is also an extensive literature dealing with optimal exchange rate management (optimal exchange market intervention) in nonindexed economics. See, e.g., papers in Bhandari (1985) and the references therein. We should note that, some authors, for example Flood and Marion (1982) , assume that the money supply follows a random walk. However, they do not address issues of optimal stabilization policy.
4.
Note that our analysis abstracts from input and input price shocks. These are considered by several authors. A recent paper by Aizenman and Frenkel (1986) considers wage indexation and monetary rules in response to productivity and input shocks under perfect information. Marston and Turnovsky (1985a) analyze alternative wage indexation rules in response to import price shocks, again under the assumption of perfect information. By contrast, Marston and Turnovsky (l985b) analyze the case where the productivity disturbances are firm-specific. They show that if these are observed by the firm alone, perfect stabilization of the economy can be attained by the combination of a wage indexation rule and a rather complicated taxation scheme.
5.
This means that instantaneously the firm may not know its own Output. Of course once v is observed, its output can be inferred, but the point is that this information may become available only after the current production decision is made.
6.
Note that our welfare criterion is precisely the same as that introduced by Aizenman and Frenkel (1985) under their information assumptions (our case (iii)). Subtracting (13) from (9) 
E(v)
) p-w+ 1+n9
Minimizing var (y -yj) is equivalent to minimizing the loss function (31) of Aizenman and Frenkel (1985).
7.
In addition the general solutions for expectations et*+1,t include a term containing an arbitrary constant A say. This reflects the non-uniqueness of rational expectations solutions.
In the case of (2 Ia), A must be set to zero to ensure that the solution is stable. In the case of (21b), however, stability considerations alone do not suffice to determine A.
This can be determined by invoking some additional restriction. Here we adopt the "minimal state representation" procedure proposed by McCallum (1983) and widely used (for some time) by others. This involves picking the rational expectations solution based on the simplest solution and means that A = 0, independent of stability considerations.
The notion that solutions are based on minimum information is appealing in that it embodies the idea that forecaster use scarce information efficiently.
8.
In (21b) = z for j 1, meaning that past values of z are known at time t. The case where expectations are backward-looking, while consistent with rational expectations, is of less economic interest. In the cases we discuss, the expectations are always forward-looking.
9.
The fact that 1 supports the claim made previously that full wage indexation is nonoptimal. It can be shown that the minimized (positive) variance obtained under this optimal rule is less than what would be obtained under full wage indexation.
10. Since the disturbances we are considering are exogenous to the model this procedure is perfectly consistent with agents having rational expectations. 
